HOLLOWAY V. UNITED STAT.S THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT EXAMINES "CONDITIONAL INTENT" IN

THE ANTI CAR THEFr ACT OF 1992
For more than one hundred years, the Due Process Clause' of
the Fourteenth Amendment has provided the framework that
compels the government to prove every element of a charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 American criminal law has long
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o
person

shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, is applicable only to the
federal government. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAw § 10-7,
at 663 (2d ed. 1988). But see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment binds the states: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). Due process is "a
principle basic to our society." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Due Process Clause
incorporates both procedural and substantive due process rights. See generally TRIBE,
supra, §§ 10 & 15. Procedural due process, as guaranteed by both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, addresses the requirements of notice and the opportunity
to be heard in the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. See BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, procedural due process essentially
"guarantee[s] those procedures which are required for the 'protection of ultimate
decency in a civilized society.'" TRIBE, supra, § 10-8, at 678 (quoting Adamson v.
Conversely,
California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
substantive due process requires that legislation be reasonable, fair in content, and
advance a legitimate governmental objective. See BLACK's LAw DIcToNARY 1429 (6th
ed. 1990). Substantive due process involves those rights not explicitly delineated by
the United States Constitution itself, but that the Court nevertheless has deemed
fundamental. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of
Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of SubstantiveDue Process, 16 U. DAYrON L.
REV. 313, 313-14 (1991). Due process, in the criminal context, protects the interests
of a defendant's right to a fair trial. See TRIBE, supra, § 10-8, at 683-84; see also Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that a right to jury trial is
Due process is unjustly
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice").
disregarded when an individual is divested of liberty "'on a record lacking any
relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged."' Vachon v. New
Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 480 (1974) (quoting Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232,
1233 (1971) (Douglas,J., in chambers)).
2 See Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1665 (1987); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)
(granting constitutional status to the reasonable doubt standard under principles of
due process). Although the Winship Court constitutionalized the standard in 1970,
the notion of "reasonable doubt" has been perpetuated by American courts since at
least 1793. SeeJessica N. Cohen, The ReasonableDoubtJuy Instruction: Giving Meaning
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embraced the fundamental principle that the state may procure an
accused's conviction only if the accused has committed the wrongful
act with a culpable mental state.' Indeed, crimes bearing the label

to a Critical Concept, 22 Am. J. CRIM. L. 677, 677 (1995) (observing that, in State v.
Wilson, 1 N.J.L. 502, 506 (1793), a New Jersey judge instructed the jurors "to follow
the 'human rule' and acquit the defendant if they had 'reasonable doubts' about his
guilt"). The reasonable doubt standard prohibits any device that effectively shifts the
burden of confuting any substantive element of the charged crime to the accused.
SeeJOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 13.4(b), at 520
(5th ed. 1995). Moreover, the Winship Court specified certain interests that the
standard protects. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64. First, the Court noted the
inherent disadvantage that would be tantamount to a denial of "fundamental
fairness, if [the defendant] could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the
strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case." Id. at 363. Second,
the Court acknowledged the profound societal values that stress the importance of
the "good name and freedom of every individual [and thus] should not condemn a
man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt." Id.
at 363-64. Finally, the Court recognized that the community must have confidence
in, and respect for, the applications of American criminal law. See id. at 364. To this
end, the Court declared that "[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law
not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned." Id.
' See Deborah M. Weiss, Note, Scope, Mistake, and Impossibility: The Philosophy of
Language and Problems of Mens Rea, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1983). Commonlaw crimes, at least from the seventeenth century, have required not only the
commission of the act, but also the existence of mens rea. SeeJ.W.C. Turner, The
Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31, 35 (1938); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "mens rea" as "a guilty mind; a
guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent"). A strict liability crime, however, does
not require the accused to possess a particular mental state. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SuBSTANTIvE CRIMINAL LAw § 3.8, at 340 (1986) [hereinafter
LAFAvE & ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW]. Generally, strict liability crimes do not
warrant the imposition of harsh penalties, such as prison sentences. See id. at 340-41.
Crimes of strict liability are defined as "[u]nlawful acts whose elements do not
contain the need for criminal intent or mens rea." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1422 (6th
ed. 1990) (emphasis in original); see also Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States,
72 B.U. L. REv. 463, 463 (1992) (observing that the notion of strict liability tolerates
the absence of a culpable mental state). In a broad sense, strict liability crimes
involve "acts that endanger the public welfare, such as illegal dumping of toxic
wastes."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
Culpability, on the other hand, "requires a showing that [the criminal] acted
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect
to each material element of the offense." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 379 (6th ed.
1990) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the most serious culpable mental state is one
founded on purpose or intention, followed by knowledge, recklessness, and lastly,
negligence. See Simons, supra, at 463. The characterization of the differing culpable
states and their respective levels of severity is significant because "deeply ingrained in
our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the
more serious is the offense, and therefore, the more severely it ought to be
punished."
Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness:
DifferentiatingBetween Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
21, 39-40 (1997) (citation omitted).
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"specific intent"4 - also referred to as mens rea' - necessitate a
"knowing" or "purposeful" state of mind.6 At the core of the concept
of purposeful intent is the implicit understanding that one's purpose
is fulfilled even when that purpose is merely conditional.7 Recently,
in Holloway v. United States,8 the United States Supreme Court held
that the government could satisfy the "specific intent" requirement of
' See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990). Generally, specific intent is
defined as "the intent to accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits." Id.
5 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28,

at 201 (1972) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw]. Except
for strict liability crimes, some sort of discernible mental state is generally viewed as a
precondition to guilt. See id.
' SeeJOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAw 235 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
LAW]. The Model Penal Code, in essence, has done away with the label "specific
intent" and has replaced it with the terms "knowingly" and "purposely." See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i), (b)(i) (1985) (defining "knowingly" as a person's
awareness and "purposely" as a person's conscious object). "General intent" crimes,
conversely, implicate the much broader notion of merely intending to commit an act
that is prohibited by law. See BLAcK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990). Typically,
general intent crimes alleviate the government's burden of proving that the accused
intended to cause the precise harm or result that occurred. See id. Sometimes,
general intent is referred to in the same context as "criminal intent." See LAFAVE &
ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, § 28, at 201. In that regard,
criminal intent, as well as general intent, pertain to the more generalized criminal
mental states of negligence or recklessness. See id.The Model Penal Code, as with
"special intent," has done away with the phrase "general intent" in favor of the terms
"recklessly" and "negligently." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d) (1985).
"Recklessly" is defined as when a person "consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct." Id.
§ 2.02(2) (c). The Code defines "negligently" as when a person "should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct." Id. § 2.02(2) (d).
7 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(6) cmt. 8 (Official Draft 1962
& rev. cmts. 1985). Model Penal Code § 2.02(6) provides:
Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose Is Conditional.
When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is
established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition
negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining
the offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (1985). To illustrate, "it is no less a burglary if the
defendant's purpose was to steal only if no one was at home or if he found the object
he sought." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(6), cmt.8 (Official Draft
1962 & rev. cmts. 1985). In this context, the condition does not negate the evil that
the statute defining "burglary" was designed to control, regardless of whether the
condition occurred or failed. See id. Alternatively, "it would not be an assault with
the intent to rape, if the defendant's purpose was to accomplish the sexual relation
only if the mature victim consented; the condition negatives the evil with which the
law has been framed to deal." Id. If, however, the defendant's purpose was to force
himself upon her in the event that she resisted, then he would be guilty of an assault
with the intent to rape. See id.
' 119 S. Ct.966 (1999).
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the federal carjacking statute 9 by establishing that the defendant
possessed the "conditional intent"' necessary to perpetrate the act."
Since the nineteenth century, courts have endorsed the
conditional intent doctrine as an important device in bridging the
purposeful or knowing elements of assault." Conditional intent is
best exemplified by an assault during which a defendant merely
threatens to inflict injury unless the victim complies with certain
demands, but never actually harms the victim.'3 Underlying the
sweeping acceptance of the principle is the dangerous probability
that the person who expresses an intent to injure to facilitate a
criminal act ultimately will act upon the overt threat of harm."
Numerous judicial and scholarly endorsements accept the premise
that the "specific intent" necessary to commit a criminal act may be
merely conditional.
' See Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998). For further discussion
of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 and its 1994 amendment, see infra note 16 and
accompanying text.
'oSee infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (providing broad introductory
analysis on "conditional intent").
" See Holloway, 119 S.Ct. at 972. Specifically, the statute was challenged on its
inclusion of the words "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Id. at
969.
1
See, e.g., State v.Morgan, 25 N.C. 186, 192-94 (3 Ired. 1842) (finding that the
conditional intent to deal a blow with an axe was sufficient to demonstrate the
"present purpose of doing harm" requisite for assault). Likewise, in People v.
McMakin, the court explained that
[wihere a party puts in a condition which must be at once performed,
and which condition he has no right to impose, and his intent is
immediately to enforce performance by violence, and he places himself
in a position to do so, and proceeds as far as it is then necessary for him
to go in order to carry out his intention, then it is as much an assault as
if he had actually struck, or shot, at the other party, and missed him. It
would, indeed, be a great defect in the law, if individuals could be held
guiltless under such circumstances.
People v. McMakin, 8 Cal. 547, 548-49 (1857); see also 1 B.E. WrKIN & NORMAN L.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 416, at 477 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that "a
threatened act may amount to an assault even though the threat is conditional or
qualified").
"SSee 2 CHALEs E. TORCIA, WI-LHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 182, at 427-28 (15th ed.
1994).
14 See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYcE, CRIMINAL LAW 647 (3d ed. 1982).

To illustrate, "where a robber orders his victim to put up his hands or be killed, the
probability is that he means what he says." Id.
'5 See Holloway, 119 S.Ct. at 971. Numerous states have incorporated within
various penal statutes the well-recognized doctrine of conditional intent, confirming
it as an established principle of criminal law. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 254
(1995) ("The fact that a defendant's intention was conditional is immaterial unless
the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the statute
defining the offense."); HAW. REv. STAT. § 702-209 (1993) ("When a particular intent
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Specifically, Congress enacted the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992
(Act)' in response to the abhorrent nature of the emerging crime of
carjacking.' 7 With the Act, Congress sought to supplement state
carjacking statutes by making carjacking a federal offense." Congress
is necessary to establish an element of an offense, it is immaterial that such intent was
conditional unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented
by the law prohibiting the offense."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(f) (West 1998)
("Requirement of intent satisfied if intent is conditional. - When a particular intent
is an element of an offense, the element is established although such intent is
conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented
by the law defining the offense.").
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994). The statute provided, in pertinent part:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title,
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received
in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of
another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so,
shall (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury... results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for
any number of years up to life, or both.
Id. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, however,
amended the statute in the following manner:
(14) CARJACKING. - Section 2119(3) of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by striking the period after "both" and inserting ", or
sentenced to death."; and by striking ", possessing a firearm as defined
in section 921 of this title," and inserting ", with the intent to cause
death or serious bodily harm".
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
60003(a) (14), 108 Stat. 1796, 1970 (1994). The statute now provides:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor
vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or
foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force
and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury.., results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for
any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998) (emphasis added).
" See F. Georgann Wing, Puttingthe Brakes on Caijackingor AcceleratingIt? The Anti
Car Theft Act of 1992, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 385, 389 (1994). "Carjacking" is a crime of
violence in which "the vehicle is taken from a person by force, violence or
intimidation." Id. The Department of Justice defines "carjacking" as a theft or
attempted theft of a vehicle by threat or use of force. See Michael J. Sniffen, Half of
CaijackingsSuccessful, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 8, 1999.
'3 SeeAnti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-519, § 101(b), 106 Stat. 3384, 3384
(1992). This legislation provides:
(b) FEDERAL COOPERATION TO PREVENT "CARJACKING" AND
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was cognizant of the increased number of carjacking incidents

nationally' 9 and of the detrimental societal effects"0 of carjacking.'
Acting pursuant to powers granted by the Commerce Clause, n yet
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT. - In view of the increase of motor vehicle
theft with its growing threat to human life and to the economic wellbeing of the Nation, the Attorney General, acting through the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorneys, is urged to
work with State and local officials to investigate car thefts, including
violations of section 2119 of title 18, United States Code, for armed car
jacking, and as appropriate and consistent with prosecutorial
discretion, prosecute persons who allegedly violate such law and other
relevant Federal statutes.
Id.

19See Nora Zamichow, Deadly Caijacking Raises Questions and Fears - Crime Wave:
Commandeering of Cars Is on the Increase. San Diego Has Had 171 Cases This Year, as the
Nationwide Trend Continues, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1992, at BI ("The nation's major cities
have reported an increase during the past three years in this terrifying version of car
theft, a behind-the-wheel mugging that can leave a hapless driver stranded, injured
or dead.").
'0 See Wing, supra note 17, at 386.
One particularly glaring carjacking account
sparked a congressional call for tougher treatment of suspected carjackers. See
"Cajacking" Death Stuns Community - Crime Spurs Congressional Call for Tougher
Handling of Suspects in Auto-Theft Cases, ARIz. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Sept. 11, 1992, at
A4. Specifically, Pamela Basu, a mother of a 22-month-old girl, had her car taken
from her by two men. See id. The men forced Basu, while taking her child to
preschool, from her car at a stop sign by her home. See id. Basu was caught in the
seatbelt as the thieves drove away, while her child remained in the car. See id. After
driving approximately a half-mile, the thieves dropped the 22-month-old off in the
middle of road. See id. All the while Basu was still being dragged to her death. See id.
In an attempt to dislodge her lifeless body from the car, "the driver ran up against a
fence" after traveling roughly one-and-a-half miles. Id. Indeed, Basu's death led
Representative Cardiss Collins to remark that "the public has become aware that car
theft is not only an economic tragedy, it has become a human tragedy." House Passes
CaijackingLegislation,HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 6, 1992, at 6 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Likewise, when President George Bush signed the bill into law, he stated
that "[w ]e cannot put up with this kind of animal behavior" and that " [t]hese people
have no place in a decent society. And as far as this president's concerned, they can
go to jail, and they can stay in jail, and they can rot in jail for crimes like that."
Martin Kasindorf, Bush Touts Tougher Crime Stance, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 29, 1992, at
5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
" See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Anti-Car Theft Act (18 US.C. § 2119), 140 A.L.R. FED. 249 (1997). The Anti Car Theft
Act was enacted to reduce the rising number of carjackings, to diminish the threat to
the lives of innocent motorists, and to ensure "the financial well-being of insurers of
automobiles in interstate commerce." Id.
" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause furnishes Congress with
the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id. "[T]he Commerce Clause [has] evolved into
a conduit for national efforts to reform social problems that had not been adequately
addressed by the states." Larry E. Gee, Comment, Federalism Revisited: The Supreme
Court Resurrects the Notion of Enumerated Powers by Limiting Congress's Attempt to Federalize
Crime, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 151, 168 (1995). The Commerce Clause, the primary source
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with respect for traditional state law-enforcement authority,2
Congress intended to create a powerful statutory deterrent to the
commission of this violent crime. 4
In so doing, Congress
incorporated a specific intent requirement in a 1994 amendment,
specifically targeting car thieves that25 use violence or the serious threat
of violence to accomplish the theft.
of today's federal power, essentially enables the passage of purportedly crucial social
legislation. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REv. 1387, 1387 (1987). This clause only requires that, regardless of how remote or
indirect, the regulated activity affect, burden, or obstruct interstate commerce. See
id. Over the years, the Commerce Clause powers have evolved to allow Congress to
regulate three broad and distinct categories of activity:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce ... [and] those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citations omitted). After
decades of judicial deference to Congress's expansive reliance on the Commerce
Clause, which had prohibited the possession of firearms in school zones, the Court,
in Lopez, for the first time in nearly 60 years struck down federal legislation derived
from Commerce Clause power. See Nicole Huberfeld, Note, The Commerce Clause PostLopez: It's Not Dead Ye4 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 182, 185 (1997); see also Charles B.
Schweitzer, Comment, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and the Federal Docket: The
Impact of United States v. Lopez, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 71, 71 (1995) (noting that "Lopez is
significant because it invalidated a federal law under the Commerce Clause for the
first time since 1936"). Specifically, the Court held that the mere possession a gun in
a school zone did not, by itself, "substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. Despite its previous decisions endorsing judicial deference
with respect to the implementation of the Clause, the Court refused to perpetuate
such sweeping interpretations for fear of encroaching upon the powers of the states
under principles of federalism. See id. Indeed, the Court observed that an overly
expansive interpretation of the Clause would mean that "there will never be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Id. For a further
discussion advocating a more restrictive interpretation of the Clause, see generally
Epstein, supra.
See Wing, supra note 17, at 412 ("[C]rimes arising out of street violence
normally are best handled by state and local law enforcement authorities.").
21 See 140 CONG. REc. E858 (daily ed. May 5, 1992) (statement
of Rep. Franks).
In amending the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 (Act) with the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Representative Gary A. Franks declared that
"[w]e must send a message to the criminal that committing a violent crime will carry
a severe penalty. This legislation will make an additional 22 crimes including
carjacking and driveby shootings, subject to the death penalty." Id. Likewise,
Senator Joseph Lieberman pronounced that "[tihis amendment will broaden and
strengthen that law so our U.S. attorneys have every possible tool available to them to
attack the problem." 139 CONG. REc. S15301 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Lieberman).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text
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In the recent case of Holloway v. United States, the Supreme Court
addressed the problem of courts' conflicting application of the Act's
intent requirement.26 The Court concluded that the Act's intent
element is satisfied by proof that at the precise moment at which the
defendant demanded the victim's automobile, the defendant
possessed the requisite conditional intent to cause grievous injury or
death, if necessary, to effectuate the theft.2 In so holding, the Court
announced that any other reading of the Act would conflict with the
congressional goal of prohibiting carjacking.2 ' Further, the Court
found it reasonable to assume that, when drafting the Act, Congress
was fully conscious of the abundance of supporting legal authority
acknowledging that the specific intent to perpetrate a wrongful act
may be conditional.2
Over the course of two days, beginning on October 14, 1994, the
petitioner, Fran4ois Holloway (also known as Abdu Ali (Ali)) and his
accomplice carjacked three automobiles." Pursuant to requests made
by a "chop shop' for certain types of vehicles, the defendants
(reproducing text of the Act).
See Holloway v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 966, 969 (1999).
"
See id. at 972. The majority specifically incorporated the statute when it stated:
The intent requirement of § 2119 is satisfied when the Government
proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control
over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to
seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car (or,
alternatively, if unnecessary to steal the car).
Id.
See id. at 971 (noting that the "petitioner's interpretation would exclude from
the coverage of the statute most of the conduct that Congress obviously intended to
prohibit").
See id. (stating that "it is reasonable to presume that Congress was familiar with
the cases and the scholarly writing that have recognized that the 'specific intent' to
commit a wrongful act may be conditional").
" See United States v. Holloway, 921 F. Supp. 155, 156-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The
defendant, Franois Holloway, also answered to the name Abdu Ali (Ali). See id. at
155. Ali's accomplice, Vernon Lennon, was essentially responsible for Ali's inclusion
in the commission of the thefts. See id. at 156. Lennon, not knowing how to
disengage car alarm systems or "hot wire" cars, could only steal vehicles from their
drivers at gunpoint. See id. To accomplish the theft, Lennon needed a partner in
order to have one person drive the stolen vehicle and the other to drive the pursuit
car. See id. Consequently, Lennon recruited Ali, whom he had known since they
were children. See id. On October 14, 1994, the defendants stole the first car, a 1992
Nissan Maxima. See id. The following evening, they stole the next two cars, a 1991
Toyota Celica and 1988 Mercedes Benz, respectively. See id. The defendants were
also suspected in two uncharged crimes. See id. at 157 n.2.
Generally, a "chop shop" is defined as
any building, lot, facility, or other structure or premise where one or
destroying,
concealing,
in
receiving,
engage
more
persons
disassembling, dismantling, reassembling, or storing any passenger
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located and stalked the designated automobiles and their respective
drivers. 2 To steal the vehicles, the defendants waited for the targeted
cars to stop and for the drivers to exit.33 After this sequence of events,
Ali and his accomplice brazenly approached, brandishing a firearm
and demanding the keys to the cars along with other valuables.M The
defendants threatened to shoot the victims if they did not comply
with the defendants' demands.3 On all three occasions, Ali and his
accomplice planned to leave the victims unharmed.36 In committing
each robbery, the criminals intended to threaten use of the gun to
steal the vehicle, but did not intend actually to use the gun to kill or
to otherwise seriously injure the victim.3 7 Ali and his accomplice
motor vehicle or passenger motor vehicle part which has been
unlawfully obtained in order to alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy,
disguise, falsify, forge, obliterate, or remove the identity[,] including
the vehicle identification number or derivative thereof, of such vehicle
or vehicle part and to distribute, sell, or dispose of such vehicle or
vehicle part in interstate commerce.
7AAM.JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 418 (1997).
32 See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 156-57. Lennon's father, Teddy Arnold, ran a
"chop shop" for which Lennon would provide stolen cars. See id. at 156. In
particular, Arnold would provide a full description of the vehicles that he wanted,
including year and model. See id. Lennon and his partner then would attempt to
find and steal that car. See id.
" See id. at 156-57 (detailing three separate occasions in which the defendants
employed this tactic).
3
See id. In the first instance, the defendants followed the 69-year-old driver of
the Maxima to his home. See id. at 156. As the driver exited his car, the defendants
also got out of theirs. See id. Simultaneously, Lennon approached with the gun
pointed at the driver, while demanding the car keys and his wallet. See id. The next
evening, the defendants tracked their second victim to her friend's home, where
again, Lennon converged on the victim, with weapon aimed, and, as she exited the
vehicle, made the perfunctory demand for her money and keys. See id. Likewise,
that same evening, the defendants followed the driver of the Mercedes to his home,
and yet again, the defendants overtook the driver as he was exiting the vehicle. See
id. Only this time, the driver, sensing danger, immediately got back in his car, only
to hear Lennon's demand, at gun point, to get out of the car. See id. at 157. The
defendants made the same demands, but the driver hesitated, leading Ali to strike
the victim in the face. See id. Although the driver ran away, the defendants still
managed to steal his car and money. See id.
See id. at 156-57. During the thefts of the Maxima and Mercedes, Lennon
verbally threatened to shoot the drivers if they did not meet his demands. See id. For
example, one of the victims stated that Lennon threatened, "'Get out of the car or
I'll shoot.'" United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1997). Yet another
testified that Lennon said, "'Give me your keys or I will shoot you right now.'" Id.
With respect to stealing the Celica, Lennon enforced his commands simply by
pointing the gun. See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 156.
See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 157. Lennon provided testimony in which he
professed that the plan was simply to steal the cars without actually harming the
victims. See Arnold, 126 F.3d at 84.
" See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 157. Lennon, however, did say that, if necessary,
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never discharged the firearm during the commission of any of the
carjackings.?
On February 2, 1995, a federal grand jury indicted Ali on three
counts of carjacking and three counts relating to the use of a firearm
for carjacking purposes. 9 At his jury trial before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Ali was convicted
on all charges.4 Following the verdict, Ali moved for a new trial ,
and in the alternative sought reconsideration of an unsuccessful
motion that he had brought during trial, in which he had openly
challenged the level of proof necessary to satisfy the Act's intent
element by arguing that the statute effectively excluded his actions
from its purview. 2 The district court reiterated its denial of the initial
motion and denied his post-verdict motion for a new trial. 3
According to the court, Ali's action - using a gun to terrorize drivers
into giving up their vehicles - was precisely what Congress intended
to ban." More importantly, the court denounced the petitioner's
he would have fired the gun if any of the victims had resisted or given him "'a hard
time.'" SeeArnold, 126 F.3d at 84.
See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 157. An experienced criminal is aware that using
a gun leads to a lengthier prison term, as opposed to a shorter term received for
merely robbing someone of their car. See id.
"g See id. at 155. Two of Ali's victims identified him from a police line-up on
November 22, 1994. See Arnold, 126 F.3d at 84. Just after Ali's identification, the
police received Ali's confession regarding his participation in three carjackings. See
id. Specifically, "[Ali] was charged with conspiring to operate a 'chop shop,' in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, operating a chop shop, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2322,
three counts of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and three counts of using
and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the charged carjackings, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)." Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 156-57.
'* See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 156. The jury convicted Ali in December 1995.
See id.
" See id. The petitioner made his primary motion pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that such relief was required to satisfy
the interests of justice. See id. Rule 33 states that "[o]n a defendant's motion, the
court may grant a new trial to that defendant if the interests of justice so require."
FED. R. CRiM. P. 33. The petitioner's alternative motion was brought in accordance
with Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Holloway, 921 F. Supp.
at 156.
'2 See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 156. The district court observed that the issue
raised by Ali's motion was also the issue central to the trial, which was "what must the
government prove to satisfy the intent element of the carjacking statute ... ?" Id.
Attempting to capitalize on an apparent statutory loophole, Ali argued that the
statute no longer pertained to his actions - utilizing a gun to effectuate the theft because the 1994 amendment omitted "possessing a firearm." See id.; see also supra
note 16 (reproducing text of the Act).
See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 161.
" See id. at 159-60 (discussing the court's statutory analysis of the defendant's
claim).
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literalist argument that, under the Act, a perpetrator must
unconditionally intend to kill or injure the victims. 45 Maintaining
that the concept of conditional intent defeated Ali's flawed assertion,
the court found that Ali's intent to use the firearm should the victims
have resisted was sufficient to -satisfy the statutory intent
requirement." Lastly, the court disposed of the petitioner's rule of
lenity claim47 by determining that whether conditional intent satisfies
the mens rea element of a carjacking offense is a question of criminal
law, rather than a question of statutory construction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of both of Ali's post-trial motions.4 9 In a two-toone decision, the appeals court concluded that, while the Act's 1994
See id. at 159. The court observed that, under such a reading, the statute would
not expressly punish the crimes perpetrated by the defendants, when the intent of
the thieves was to steal cars, not to kill or seriously injure people. See id. The court
recognized that if this were the case, a large majority of carjackers would be insulated
from federal prosecution because most carjackers, in general, do not mean to cause
bodily harm or to kill, but rather, hope for the victim to give up the car peaceably.
See id. Acceptance of Ali's interpretation, as noted by the court, would drastically
narrow the statute's scope because, in effect, only those carjackers intending to not
only steal cars, but also to seriously injure or murder the victim, could be prosecuted.
See id.
' See id. Specifically, the court stated that "[w]here a crime is defined to require
a particular intention, that element is satisfied even if the requisite intent is
conditional, unless the condition negatives the evil sought to be prevented by the
statute." Id. Under this analysis, the court posited that "[t]he evil sought to be
prevented by § 2119 is not 'negatived' by the condition, it is the condition. Section
2119 is not a murder or assault statute, it is a car robbery statute." Id. at 160; see also
supra note 16 (reproducing text of the Act).
4
See id. at 160; see also BLACK'S LAW DInONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that
the "rule of lenity" gives the defendant the benefit of the doubt "[w]here the
intention of Congress is not clear from the act itself and reasonable minds might
differ as to its intention ....
").
" See Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 160. The court provided jury instructions
addressing the element of intent with respect to carjacking counts, which stated:
In some cases, intent is conditional. That is, a defendant may intend to
engage in certain conduct only if a certain event occurs. In this case,
the government contends that the defendant intended to cause death
or serious[ ] bodily harm if the alleged victims had refused to turn over
their cars. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
had such an intent, the government has satisfied this element of the
offense.
If you find that the co-defendant, Vernon Lennon, acted with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, that is not sufficient. You
must find that the defendant shared in that intent before you can
conclude that this element has been satisfied. I remind you that you
must consider each count separately.
Id. at 160-61.
'9See United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997).
41
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amendment clearly limited the scope of its applicability, the statute
nevertheless covered Ali's conduct.' According to the majority, a
reasonable interpretation of the Act, supported by the expressed
intentions of the drafters, fully endorses the use of conditional intent
to satisfy the statute's specific intent requirement.5' The court of
appeals, which noted the extensive authority relied upon by the
district court, ultimately adopted the lower court's well-reasoned
application of conditional intent; thus, the court found that the Act
proscribed Ali's use of an express threat of violence to facilitate his
carjacking"
Recognizing the need to establish a cogent and uniform
application of the Act's seemingly ambiguous intent requirement, the
United States Supreme Court granted the petitioner's request for
certiorari." Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, announced that
N See id. at 86, 88. The court commented that, even though Congress intended
to broaden the scope of the statute, the actual effect of adding a specific intent
element in the 1994 amendment was to severely limit its applicability to only those
carjackings in which the criminal intended death or serious injury. See id. at 86.
Notwithstanding the self-restrictive language, the court validated the district court's
ruling that Ali possessed the undisputed conditional intent to inflict harm or death if
necessary to complete the carjacking. See id. at 88. The dissenting judge, however,
postulated that, based on a plain reading of the statute, the district court erred in
providing a conditional intent instruction when the statute expressly requires a
specific intent and fails to address proof of conditional intent. See id. at 90 (Miner,J,
dissenting). Moreover, the dissent denounced the majority for its "clear judicial
usurpation of congressional authority." Id. at 92 (Miner, J, dissenting).
" See id. at 86-89. In supporting its decision, the court declared that "most
importantly, incorporating conditional intent within the specific intent language of
the carjacking statute comports with a reasonable interpretation of the legislative
purpose of the statute." Id. at 88. Moreover, the court addressed the concern that
"[tlhe alternative interpretation would have the federal carjacking statute covering
only those carjackings in which the carjacker's sole and unconditional purpose at the
time he committed the carjacking was to kill or maim the victim." Id. To adopt such
an interpretation, as noted by the court, would drastically limit the statute's intended
reach. See id. The court then recognized that "'[i]t is well-established that in
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and its object and policy.'" Id.
at 88-89 (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995)). As a
result, the court announced that it should not adopt a literal interpretation of the
statute if its results would be at odds with Congress's intended purpose. See id. at 89.
The court explained that, while it should not redraft a poorly worded statute, the
court has a duty to interpret the statute so as to provide it with a reasonable meaning.
See id
5, See id. at 89. Consequently, the court found that the district court did not err
in issuing its conditional intentjury instruction. See id.
'" See Holloway v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1558 (1999). The Court recognized
the need to resolve an interpretational split among the circuit courts. See Holloway v.
United States, 119 S. Ct. 966, 966 (1999). Specifically, in United States v. Randolph, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that, in interpreting the Act,
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evidence of conditional intent fulfills the Act's specific intent
requirement.5
More specifically, the Court held that Ali's mere
conditional intent to execute his proffered threat of violence if
necessary to perpetrate the carjacking did, by itself, adequately fulfill
the statutory mandate of specific intent. 5
In reaching this
conclusion, the Court articulated that, based on the principles of
statutory construction, acceptance of Ali's contrary interpretation
would subvert Congress's obvious intent to address meaningfully the
nation's carjacking crisis.- The Court further extrapolated that
Congress, fully abreast of supporting authority, embraced the
application of the conditional intent concept as it pertained to the
Act.57
The provenance of conditional intent jurisprudence in the
American legal system is traceable to the early eighteen hundreds."
In one of the foremost cases, United States v. Richardson,59 the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia returned an indictment for an
assault in which an armed defendant entered the home of a victim
carjacking was a specific intent crime, and as a result, the government failed to
present sufficient evidence proving that the carjacker intended to kill or to seriously
injure the driver. See id. at 969 n.4 (discussing United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d
656, 664-65 (9th Cir. 1996)). In overturning the defendant's carjacking conviction,
the court of appeals stated that neither threatening a driver that "'she would be okay
if she [did] what was told of her'" nor "'the brandishing of a weapon, without more'"
suffices as an intent to cause grievous bodily injury or death under the statute's 1994
amendment. Id. at 969 n.4 (citing Randolph, 93 F.3d at 664, 665) (alteration in
original); see also infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Randolph
decision). Most importantly, the appeals court stated that "[t]he mere conditional
intent to harm a victim if she resists is simply not enough to satisfy § 2119's new
specific intent requirement." Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 969 n.4. It is this contention
with which the other circuit courts have disagreed. See id.; see, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 136 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1997); United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1310 (1998); United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 123 (1997). For further discussion of these cases, see supra notes 49-52 and
infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text (providing detailed analysis of the Arnold,
Williams, Romero, and Anderson decisions).
"' SeeHolloway, 119 S. Ct. at 972.
5' See id.; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text (reproducing the Court's
language with respect to this portion of its decision).
" See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 972 ("In short, we disagree with petitioner's reading
of the text of the Act and think it unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to
enact such a truncated version of an important criminal statute.").
, See id. at 971; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (reproducing the
majority's language referencing this portion of its opinion).
-" See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 27 F. Cas. 43, 43 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (returning a
guilty verdict for assault when a defendant, running toward the witness with clenched
fist, threatened "' [i] f you say so again, I will knock you down'").
" 27 F. Cas. 798 (C.C.D.C. 1837).
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6 Finding the
and threatened to strike her if she uttered a word.W
defendant guilty, the court declared that he had no right to impose
the unjust condition of prohibiting his victim from speaking by
evincing a clear intent to strike her had she disobeyed his demand.
Although the federal court system, until recently, had failed to
promulgate further guidance, state courts continued to address the
merits of conditional intent. In Hairston v. State,62 the Mississippi
Supreme Court considered whether a conditional threat of violence
is tantamount to establishing an assault with an intent to murder.6
To find the defendant guilty, the court noted that it must find that
the defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill, and not merely
an intent to assault." Notwithstanding the recognition that the
defendant perpetrated an actionable assault, the court ultimately
decided that the defendant was not guilty of intending to commit
murder; the court found the defendant not guilty because he had
conditioned his threat on a right that he was lawfully entitled to
exercise - the repossession of personal property held unlawfully by
another. 5

See id. at 798. The court recounted the fact that the defendant, armed with a
club and musket, and after having positioned himself within striking distance, then
proffered his declaration of harm. See id.
61 See id. The defendant attempted to argue, as the court noted,
that there could
be no assault without the present intent to strike. See id. The court, however, refuted
the defendant's claim by analogizing a situation in which "a stranger comes to my
house armed, and raises his club over my head, within striking[ ] distance, and
threatens to beat me unless I will go out of and abandon my house, surely that would
be an assault." Id. (emphasis added).
" 54 Miss. 689 (1877).
6' See id. at 693. Specifically, Hairston, along with two other men, attempted to
repossess personal property being unlawfully held by a plantation owner. See id. at
691-92. As the three men exited, having reclaimed the furniture, the owner
attempted to stop the wagon by grabbing the mules, thereby committing trespass on
Hairston's personal property, and subsequently prompting Hairston to point the gun
and threateningly warn that "'I came here to move Charles Johnston, and by C-d I
am going to do it, and I will shoot any G-d-d-d man who attempts to stop my
mules."' Id. at 691-92. The owner, sensing imminent danger, stepped away, allowing
the mules and wagon to proceed. See id. at 692.
See id. at 693-94. The court observed that the lower court had convicted
Hairston of "assault with intent to commit murder." Id. at 693. The court, however,
noted that Hairston merely made a conditional threat to shoot when his mules were
about to be taken unlawfully from his property - a right he could exercise in justly
preventing a trespass on his property. See id. The court further explained that, while
the justice system will not forgive the assault actually committed by the leveling of the
firearm, it cannot infer from this act an intent to commit murder. See id. at 693-94.
More importantly, the court held that "[t]he intent must be actual, not conditional,
and especially not conditioned upon non-compliance with a prper demand." Id. at 694
(emphasis added).
6' See id. at 693-94. The court summarized that this situation "presents a case of
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After nearly forty years, state courts continued to implement the
conditional ihtent doctrine in the assault context, as illustrated by
People v. Connors.6 In Connors, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
whether threats to kill, made at gun point by members of one labor
union to members of another in order to force consolidation of the
unions, warranted the imposition of "assault to murder" convictions. 6 7
Referencing the large body of persuasive legal authority, the court
accepted the contention that the defendants' communication of their
demands and ensuing threats, coupled with their ability to carry out
the threatened harm, effected an assault, even though the victims'
submission to the condition averted the commission of the asserted
danger.
In upholding the defendants' guilty verdicts, the court
stressed that the criminal justice system will not tolerate threats of
violence used to induce compliance with unlawful demands.'
an intentional offer to commit violence, with an overt act towards its
accomplishment, based upon a conditional threat." Id. at 692. The court, having
postulated various scenarios involving the appropriate measure of force in given
situations, determined that the defendant's threat of using a firearm, in the lawful
repossession of personal property, far exceeded the justifiable level of force necessary
to stop the owner's impediment of his mules. See id. at 693. Indeed, the court stated
"[t]he means adopted are disproportioned to and not sanctioned by the end
sought." Id. While noting that Hairston could have been appropriately convicted of
assault, the court correctly noted that he was convicted of assault with intent to kill.
See id. Consequently, the court found that, while the law criminalizes the assault
because an assault actually occurred, it cannot punish the intent to kill because such
an intent did not exist. See id. at 694. Accordingly, the court refused to uphold
Hairston's conviction on "assault with intent to kill or murder," finding that pointing
a gun, by itself, is insufficient to establish such an intent. Id.
97 N.E. 643 (Ill. 1912).
67 See id. at 643.
The defendants, members of a steam-fitters labor union,
attempted to absorb a rival labor union by strongarming its members to drop their
present union and to enlist with the defendants' own union. See id. at 644. In their
efforts to bolster their union's membership ranks, the defendants approached a
construction site occupied by rival union members and offered union membership
by attempting to force some 30 to 40 people, at gun point and under threat of being
shot, to strip off their overalls and accept their "new" union membership cards. See
id at 644-45.
See id. at 647-48. The court applied the rule that "[i]f the threatened injury,
coupled with present ability to inflict it, is conditioned upon the party assailed
refusing to do something which the assailant has no right to require him to do, it will
constitute an assault, even though the conditions are complied with and therefore no
violence is used." Id. at 647 (citation omitted). In justifying this application, the
court enunciated that the law will not condone intimidation or excessive violence to
carry out an unlawful or criminal enterprise. See id. at 647-48.
69 See id. at 648. The court reasoned that in making a demand, regardless of
whether it was impossible to carry out, the act is no less criminal. See id. Moreover,
as the court stated:
No one has a right to expect or presume that any one will submit to an
illegal demand made upon him, and where, as in the case at bar, a
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After some eighty years and the passage of the Anti Car Theft
Act of 1992, the federal judiciary finally had the opportunity to revisit
conditional intent when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Randolph.70 Charged with the
task of deciding the Act's first significant "specific intent" challenge
since the amendment's inception, 7' the Randolph court questioned
whether the defendant had the requisite intent to inflict serious
injury or death such that a court could sustain a carjacking
conviction 2 The appeals court reasoned that, because the Act called
violent assault with dangerous and deadly weapons is made upon a
person in the peace of the people and a threat to destroy life is made
unless the victim complies with some unlawful demand, in determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused the case must be determined
precisely as though the unlawful demand did not exist.
Id. The court subsequently validated the lower court's jury instruction that was
issued to this effect and that stated, in pertinent part:
The court instructs you as to the intent to kill alleged in the indictment
that though you must find that there was a specific intent to kill the
prosecuting witness.. . , still, if you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the intention of the defendants was only in the
alternative - that is, if the defendants, or any of them, acting for and
with the others, then and there pointed a revolver . . . with the

intention of compelling him to take off his overalls and quit work, or to
kill him if he did not - and if that specific intent was formed in the
minds of the defendants and the shooting ... with intent [sic] to kill
was only prevented by the happening of the alternative - that is, the
compliance... with the demand that he take off his overalls and quit
work - then the requirement of the law as to the specific intent is met.
Id. at 645.
70 93 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1996).
71 See id. at 657. The court observed that no other federal courts,
to date, had
construed the statute's new intent element. See id. at 661. Referring to the Act's
1994 amendment, which added the phrase "with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm" in place of the phrase "possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of
this title[,]" the court suggested that this new language effectively converted
carjacking into a "specific intent" offense from a "general intent" crime. Id. at 660-61
(citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 60003(a) (14),
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1970 (1994)); see also supra note 16 and
accompanying text (reproducing text of the Act).
See id. at 657-58. Specifically, Randolph and three friends robbed the victim
and ultimately stole the victim's vehicle. See id. at 658. In carrying out their heist, the
defendants waited for the victim to pull up to an automatic teller machine at a bank,
and as the victim was withdrawing money, they pulled alongside her. See id. The
criminals pointed a rifle at her face and demanded the money. See id. More
importantly, Randolph, still wielding the rifle, forcibly entered the victim's vehicle,
while another defendant ordered her "'to do what was told of her"' and "'she would
be okay.'" Id. After demanding that the victim withdraw all the money she could,
Randolph demanded that she drive out of town. See id. Having reached a rural area,
Randolph released the victim unharmed and promptly fled the area via the stolen
automobile. See id. The other defendants, however, beat the victim in an effort to
foster faulty memory because they "'didn't want to see this lady go to the cops and
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for the specific intent to inflict harm, the government must prove a
special mental element beyond the mental state required to steal the
vehicle. 3 The court found that, despite the defendant's display of a
firearm coupled with a veiled threat, the defendant lacked the
requisite intent based on the observations that he never actually
harmed or expressly threatened to kill the victim. 74 In reaching this
conclusion, the court explained that the Act's new intent element
demanded more than a mere threat or simple conditional intent to
75
harm.
Reaching a different result in United States v. Anderson,76 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded, after
a thorough statutory analysis," that the defendant committed a
carjacking within the purview of the Act.78 In furthering Congress's
tell them what happened to her that night.'" Id.
See id. at 662. The court established that the "'special mental element'" is the
"'intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119
(1994)). Therefore, the court postulated that the central issue of the appeal turned
on whether Randolph took the car intending to cause serious injury or death. See id.
"' See id. at 664. In distinguishing other similar situations, the court stated that
the difference "between this case and federal cases sustaining convictions for
analogous specific intent offenses is that Randolph did not personally harm [the
victim], even though he was armed and clearly capable of harming her." Id. at 663.
The court suggested that Randolph's intent in brandishing the firearm merely was to
intimidate the victim into relinquishing her car and money. See id. at 664. Indeed,
the court indicated that, when Randolph dropped the victim off unharmed, he
demonstrated that he had no intent to harm or kill. See id. Moreover, the court
discerned that the threat itself was not vested with a subjective intent to inflict serious
injury or death. See id.
7
See id. at 665. The court based its decision on the structure and language of
the amended statute. See id. The court reasoned that, while Randolph technically
satisfied the "taking" element of the statute, which is taking a car from another "'by
force and violence or by intimidation[,]'" he failed the second statutory mandate,
which required the intent to cause harm or death. Id. Based on this line of
reasoning, the court opined that "[t]o construe a mere threat as conclusive evidence
of the new intent element would be to eliminate that additional intent element." Id.
Consequently, the court determined that a mere threat is not sufficient to satisfy the
specific intent to harm or kill. See id. But see Shaffer v. United States, 308 F.2d 654,
655 (5th Cir. 1962) (sustaining a defendant's conviction for assault with "intent to do
bodily harm" when, in order to effectuate his escape, he threatened to kill a guard
and fellow prisoners with a shotgun he had just taken from the guard).
76 108 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 123 (1997).
See id. at 480-83. Similar to the Randolph court, the appeals court began by
embarking on a substantive analysis of the statute, laboring over the statute, its
amendment, and its legislative history. See id.
7 See id. at 485. Anderson became involved in a dispute in which he ultimately
drew and discharged the firearm that he was carrying. See id. at 479. Upon fleeing
the scene, Anderson, still waiving the gun, ran in front of a marked police car, which
gave chase. See id. Trying to further his escape, the defendant approached the
victim from behind, placed the gun on the back of the victim's neck, and stated,
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intent to expand the Act's application, the court determined that the
Act's intent element is satisfied when the prosecution has shown that
the defendant intended to inflict harm if the driver resisted
relinquishing the vehicle. 9 Accordingly, the court held that the
defendant's claim that he must have intended to kill or injure the
victim while taking the car lacked merit because of the incorporation
of conditional intent into the Act.8 More significantly, the court, in
refuting the Randolph holding, explained that Congress's expressed
intent would be defeated if the infliction of harm was the necessary

"'The police [are] after me, I'm taking the car.'" Id. at 479-80 (alteration in
original). Although the victim temporarily complied, he attempted to stop Anderson
by running around to the driver's side. See id. at 480. Anderson, however, pointed
the gun out the window, and while speeding off, fired a single shot. See id. The
victim, uninjured, immediately contacted the police, who apprehended Anderson
after the vehicle stalled. See id. The court upheld the defendant's carjacking
conviction. See id. at 485.
7
See id. The court explained in relevant part:
[T]he question becomes not whether a defendant's conditional intent
is sufficient to satisfy an intent element of a statute, but which
conditions negative the harm sought to be prevented by a statute and
which will not. This analysis can be readily applied to the carjacking
statute. The determination of whether a defendant's intent to kill or
cause serious bodily harm if the victim does not relinquish his or her
car is sufficient to establish the requisite "intent to kill or cause serious
bodily harm" within the meaning of the statute, requires us to ascertain
the nature of the condition attached to the intent. When this intent is
phrased slightly differently - the intent to kill or cause serious bodily
harm to the victim unless the victim parts with his or her car - the
condition - unless the victim parts with his or her car - becomes
apparent. If, in fact, the condition is not met and the victim
relinquishes his or her vehicle, is the harm sought to be prevented by
the carjacking statute negated? We think not.
Id. at 484; see also supranote 7 (reproducing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6)). Relying
on this contextual analysis, the court proffered that
[t]he fact that a defendant is able to achieve the goal of obtaining the
car without resorting to the infliction of death or serious bodily harm
obviously does not negate the intent to cause such harm in order to
obtain the car. Whether the harm sought to be prevented by the
statute is the theft of cars, the threat to cause death or serious bodily
harm in order to obtain another's car, or the causing of death or
serious bodily harm, the intervening event of the victim giving up his
or her car in order to avoid serious injury in no way negatives the harm
sought to be prevented by the statute. Indeed, the fact that the victim
opted to turn over his or her car in the hope of avoiding serious harm
does not alter the fact that the defendant possessed an intent to cause
death or serious bodily harm in order to obtain the car.
Id.
See id. at 485 ("Accordingly, we hold.., it is sufficient for the government to
establish that the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm if the
victim refused to relinquish his or her car.").
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prerequisite to a carjacking conviction.'
Continuing the trend of embracing conditional intent as
sufficient to fulfill the Act's intent requirement, the United States
82
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Romero,
addressed the issue of whether the government had met the requisite
level of intent needed to sustain the defendant's carjacking
conviction.83
Because the evidence clearly indicated that the
defendant intended to cause harm if necessary to perpetrate the
commission of his crimes,8 the court determined that the existence
of his conditional intent substantiated his guilty verdict.85 As in
Arnold, the court voiced its disapproval of Randolph and ultimately
held that conditional intent fulfills the Act's intent requirement.8
Only months later, in United States v. Williams,"7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the Act's implicit
integration of conditional intent when it upheld the carjacking
conviction of a defendant who had enhanced his violent behavior by
using a firearm."
The court determined that, because of the
81 See id. at 483. The court buttressed its criticism of the Randolph decision by
stating, "Rarely will there be a case where there will be evidence of a defendant's
unconditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm whether or not the victim
relinquishes his or her car, yet the victim sustains no injuries." Id. The court averred
that Congress did not mean for death or grievous bodily harm to be the prerequisite
to each and every carjacking conviction. See id.
82 122 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118S. Ct. 1310 (1998).
8' See id. at 1335.
8' See id. at 1336-37. Romero was indicted on several criminal charges stemming
from an attempted robbery. See id. at 1337. Romero overtook the victims - a
mother, father, and their handicapped daughter - at their home as they exited
their vehicle. See id. at 1336. Pinning the father to the floor and placing a gun to the
back of his head, Romero demanded to know where the safe was located or he would
"'blow a hole in [the father's] head.'" Id. The father, however, indicated that the
safe was not at the house, but instead at a restaurant in town. See id. Romero then
commandeered the victim's vehicle and took the father to the restaurant. See id.
Romero's subsequent robbery was foiled by the police, however, and he was indicted
for carjacking, among other crimes. See id. at 1337.
" See id. at 1339. The court accepted that "as a general rule, 'conditional intent
is still intent.'" Id. at 1338 (quoting United States v. Arrellano, 812 F.2d 1209, 1211
n.2 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion corrected by, 835 F.2d 235 (1987)). In essence, the court,
justifying the implementation of conditional intent, endorsed the holding and
accompanying reasoning of the Anderson court. See id. at 1338-39.
See id. at 1339. In disagreeing with Randolph, the court determined that there
was only one intent element, as opposed to the two promulgated by Randolph. See id.
at 1338-39. While Randolph concluded that the act of taking the vehicle and the
intent to cause harm or death were two distinct and separate intent elements, the
Tenth Circuit ruled in Romero that the taking was the act, and that the intent to inflict
injury or death was the mens rea, of carjacking. See id. 1338-39.
8' 136 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 1998).
' See id. at 552, 554 (denying the defendant's arguments regarding the intent
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persuasive interpretation promulgated by the majority of other circuit
courts addressing this issue," the Act intended to punish the use of
the mere threat of harm and accompanying conditional intent to
cause that harm if necessary to achieve the crime." The court further
held that it is irrelevant that, because of the victim's compliance with
the demand, the threatened harm never actually occurred.9'
Faced with the circuit courts' conflicting interpretations of the
Act, the United States Supreme Court, in Holloway, reviewed the level
of intent necessary to satisfy the Act's mens rea requirement.9 2 In a
seven-to-two opinion, the Court declared that the Act's intent
requirement is fulfilled when the prosecution produces evidence that
the petitioner, at the exact moment at which he demanded his
victims' vehicles, exhibited the necessary conditional intent to inflict
-

if necessary to accomplish the theft -

death. 93

serious bodily harm or even

In so holding, the Court stated that Congress intended the

required for carjacking, and denying the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in
his case). Williams was charged with two counts of carjacking stemming from two
separate incidents. See id. at 549. In the first incident, Williams entered a parked
vehicle occupied by a mother and her young son. See id. Williams pointed the gun at
the child, uttered a "'few choice dirty words[,]'" and then ordered them to leave,
which they hurriedly did. Id. The second carjacking occurred when Williams
approached a driver from behind as she was unloading items from the car and
forcibly pushed her to the seat. See id. The driver, fearing death, instinctively
screamed, which, in addition to a passing car, was enough to force Williams to flee
with just the driver's briefcase. See id.
See id. at 551. The court fortified its decision by relying on the principles of
statutory construction to interpret the Act. See id. at 550. The court noted the
importance of not overemphasizing one particular sentence, but rather, that the
court must look at the law as a whole, in addition to the law's object and professed
policy. See id. The court acknowledged the well-reasoned findings of three of the
four circuit courts that had previously faced this issue, and declared that "conditional
intent is sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement of§ 2119." Id. at 551. The court
declined to accept the holding reached in Randolph. See id.
'0See id. at 551. The court stated:
By looking at § 2119 as a whole, including the enhanced penalties for
carjackers whose actions actually cause death or physical injury, it is
clear Congress did not intend to limit the reach of the federal
carjacking statute to those situations where a defendant
unconditionally intends death or serious bodily injury regardless of
whether the victim surrenders the vehicle.
Id.
91 See id.
at 551-52.
See Holloway v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 966, 969 (1999).
See id. at 972. The Court prefaced its final conclusion regarding the intent
element by stating- "In short, we disagree with the petitioner's reading of the text of
the Act and think it unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to enact such a
truncated version of an important criminal statute." Id.
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Act to broadly prohibit carjacking.9 Continuing along this line of
reasoning, the Court maintained that it is a fair assumption that
Congress was fully cognizant of the prevailing judicial and scholarly
opinions endorsing conditional intent, such that Congress implicitly
accepted the doctrinal underpinning that purposeful intent may be
conditional as well. 95
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,9 began the analysis by
recalling that the principles of statutory construction suggest a focus
on the initial words that the drafters chose.9 7 The justice further
explained that, while the meaning of critical words or phrases are
crucial to a statute's interpretation, the placement and purposes of
those key terms and phrases within the statutory scheme are equally
compelling.8
Justice Stevens proceeded to uncover Congress's intent in
incorporating the catalytic phrase "with intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm."9 To be more precise, the majority phrased the
ultimate question: whether a perpetrator who points a firearm at a
driver, having determined to shoot if the driver does not act in
See id. at 971.
95 See id. ("[I]t is reasonable to presume that Congress was familiar with the cases
and scholarly writing that have recognized that the 'specific intent' to commit a
wrongful act may be conditional.").
96 See id. at 967. Justice Stevens's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id.; see also infra
notes 97-129 and accompanying text (providing a full analysis of the majority's
opinion). Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas authored dissenting opinions. See
Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 972 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) and 977 (ThomasJ., dissenting); see
also infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text (providing a full analysis of the
dissenters' opinions).
91 See id. at 969. The Court relied on Justice White's opinion in United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), in which the Justice suggested that the language of
congressional statutes provides "'the most reliable evidence of [Congress's] intent.'"
Id. (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593). Indeed, the Court remarked that if the
pertinent language is unambiguous and there is an absence of contrary legislative
intent, then that language generally must be regarded as conclusive. See Turkette, 452
U.S. at 580.
9' See id. at 969; see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)
(reiterating that "[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must
look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of
the statute as a whol') (emphasis added). The Court, however, has found that, while a
statute's plain language may appear to settle the issue presented, the Court will
invariably examine the legislative history of the statute only to ascertain whether
obvious legislative history contradicts that language; in that event, such contradictory
language compels a court to question the presumption that Congress expressed its
intent based on the language it chose. See 2 Am. JUR. Administrative Law § 525, at 513
(1994) (referencing INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
99'Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 969; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998); see also supra note 16 and
accompanying text (reproducing the relevant text of the Act as later amended).
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accordance with a demand to relinquish the vehicle's keys, possesses
the requisite intent at that exact moment to seriously injure the
driver.'
The Justice announced that at the relevant time the
offender proffers his demand, he plainly possesses the forbidden
intent, regardless of whether the victim ultimately complied."'
The Court, relying on the accuracy of previous decisions
addressing the issue, observed that a carjacker's intent to hurt his
victim could be classified as either "conditional" or "unconditional."' 0'
As a result, the majority deduced that the statutory phrase in question
theoretically might represent either one of those characterizations,
or, quite conceivably, both.' 3 The Court noted that, according to the
petitioner's argument, a "plain text" reading would compel the Court
to interpret the Act as requiring "unconditional" intent, which, in
effect, would mean that the petitioner, Ali, must have actually
intended to4 kill or harm the drivers regardless of how they
responded.'
The Court, however, determined that a more sensible
examination of the Act reveals that Congress intended to criminalize
a wider range of conduct, as opposed to merely criminalizing
attempts to murder or assault in the course of car robberies.'05 The
majority noted that, when Ali's argument was viewed in context of the
Act, his proposed construction of the Act's intent element ignored
the significance of that element's placement in the Act.'06 More
specifically, the Court maintained that the Act, in essence, is aimed at
10

SeeHolloway, 119 S. Ct. at 969.

101See id.
"* See id. at 970; see also supra notes 76-81 and 87-91 and accompanying text
(discussing United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 123 (1997), and United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 1998),
respectively).
o See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 970.
See id. The Court acknowledged that Ali's version of the statute would have
required that the defendant possess an unconditional intent to kill or harm the
driver in order to perpetrate a "carjacking" as envisioned by the Act. See id. In
furtherance of this claim, the petitioner insisted "that Congress would have had to
insert the words 'if necessary' into the disputed text in order to include the
conditional species of intent within the scope of the statute." Id. (citation omitted).
Ali argued that, because it failed to include those particular words, Congress must
have meant to penalize only those carjackings in which the offender actually tried to
kill or inflict harm on the driver. See id.
" See id. The Court reiterated that "'the meaning of statutory language, plain or
not, depends on context.'" Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118
(1994)); see also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing principles of
statutory construction).
0
See Holloway, 119 S.Ct. at 970 ("[P]etitioner's argument . . .overlooks the
significance of [the intent] element's placement in the statute.").
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federally penalizing a certain type of robbery."°7 Consequently, Justice
Stevens observed that the Act's mens rea component, based on its
location in the statute, modifies the act of stealing or "taking" the
automobile.0 8 The element's placement, the majority maintained,
requires the trier of fact to focus on the offender's state of mind at
the exact moment that he took control over or demanded the vehicle
via intimidation, force, or violence." According to the Court, if the
offender has the forbidden state of mind at that critical moment,
then the Act's scienter element is satisfied."0
In reviewing the petitioner's interpretation of the intent
element, the Court posited that such a reading would improperly
alter the mens rea component from a mere modifier into an another
actus reus"' element of the Act."2 The majority reasoned that such
an alteration would unjustly shift the Act's focus onto an attempt to
injure or kill a person during the commission of the robbery.1
Rejecting the petitioner's assertion that only the inclusion of certain
intent
the Act's unconditional
contravene
words
could
requirement,"' the Court submitted that, because the text of the Act
neither specifies nor expressly excludes either species of intent, the
most natural reading of the Act encompasses both conditional and
unconditional intent."5 Consequendy, Justice Stevens concluded that
07

See id. ("The carjacking statute essentially is aimed at providing a federal

penalty for a particular type of robbery.").
log See id.
lOOSee id. ("[The element's placement] directs the factfinder's attention to the
defendant's state of mind at the precise moment he demanded or took control over
the car 'by force and violence or by intimidation.'").
no See id.

" "Actus reus," or the "guilty act," is defined as "[a] wrongful deed which renders
the actor criminally liable if combined with mens rea. The actus reus is the physical
aspect of a crime, whereas the mens rea (guilty mind) involves the intent factor."
BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990).
"' SeeHolloway, 119 S. Ct. at 970.
"1
See id.
14 See id. The Court refuted the petitioner's contention that only the inclusion of
the words "if necessary" could have successfully amended the Act's intent
requirement from unconditional to conditional. See id. The majority substantiated
this finding by stating that even "if Congress had used words such as 'if necessary' to
describe the conditional species of intent, it would also have needed to add
something like 'or even if not necessary' in order to cover both species of intent to
harm." Id. Upon this showing, the majority rejected the petitioner's entire line of
reasoning that only certain "magic words" in the statute could authorize the concept
of conditional intent. See id.
11 See id. ("Given the fact that the actual text does not mention either species
separately - and thus does not expressly exclude either - that text is most naturally
read to encompass the mens rea of both conditional and unconditional intent ...
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the Act does not merely govern those crimes16 involving the added
actus reus of an actual attempt to harm or kill.'
The Court justified its ultimate conclusion with two
considerations, each of which supports the contention that a plain
reading of the Act is entirely consistent with the congressional
intention of incorporating both species of intent."' First, the Court
asserted that the Act, in its entirety, reflects a pervasive intent to
federalize prosecutions, thus effecting a substantial deterrent against
a particular criminal activity that had prompted critical national
concern.18 With this in mind, Justice Stevens explained that a
reasonable interpretation of the Act's specific language reveals that
its desired purpose is best served by construing the Act to encompass
both the conditional and unconditional species of proscribed
intent."'
Second, Justice Stevens enunciated that the Court could
reasonably assume Congress's familiarity with the abundance of case
law and scholarly authority that has accepted that "specific intent" to
In reaching this
perpetrate a criminal act may be conditional.'
12 1
position, the majority recalled the seminal case of People v. Connors
as a cornerstone to support its conclusion.'2 Due in part to the
striking similarity of the facts,2 5 the Court embraced the Connorsjury
instruction that specific intent to murder could exist even though the
intent was conditioned on whether the victim complied with the
demand.14 The Court then asserted that this proposition typifies the
id.
See id. at 970.
See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 970.

116 See
117
18

In supporting this contention, the Court

identified the existing sources of legislative history that supported the conclusion
that the legislative intent of the Act was to serve a broad deterrent purpose. See id. at
971 n.7; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the comments
levied by certain legislators in support of the Act). Indeed, the Court recognized
that nothing in the legislative history accompanying the 1994 amendment purported
to limit the Act to the minority of carjackings in which the offender actually intended
to cause harm or death. See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 971 n.7.
The Court explained that the adoption of
119 See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 970-71.
the petitioner's reading would effectively exclude most of the conduct that Congress
had explicitly intended the Act to prohibit. See id. at 971.
120 See id.

,2' 97 N.E. 643 (Ill. 1912); see also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text
(discussing the Connors opinion).
'
SeeHolloway, 119 S. Ct. at971.
'2
Compare supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text with note 67 and
accompanying text (discussing the particular facts of Holloway and Connors,
respectively).
' See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 971; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text
(discussing and providing the Connorsjury instruction in full).
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majority of all other existing legal authorities addressing the issue.lss
Furthermore, the Court imparted that the fundamental principle
emerging from these varying sources is that an offender may not
negate wrongful intent by forcing the victim to adhere to a condition
that the offender lacks authority to impose.2
Finally, the majority dismissed the petitioner's claim that the
Court's interpretation would render the Act's specific intent
component superfluous.2
In so doing, the Court pointed out that
this reading of the Act afforded defendants a safeguard by still
requiring the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
an offender would have at least tried to seriously injure or kill the
driver if necessary to accomplish the taking of the vehicle. 28 Justice
Stevens concluded by reiterating that the Act's specific intent
element is fulfilled by proving that at the exact moment that the
petitioner demanded the vehicle or asserted control over the vehicle,
he possessed the conditional intent to kill or inflict harm on the
driver if required to perpetrate the car robbery/2
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion'" and immediately
challenged the Court's connotation of "intent" and its
multidimensional meanings.'
In support of this argument, the
SSee Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 971; see also Eby v. State, 290 N.E.2d 89, 95 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1973) (affirming a conviction for burglary with intent to commit violence, when
violence did not actually occur, stating "[tihat he also had, or may have had, a
different purpose or reason for breaking and entering would subtract nothing from
the reasonability of inferring the concurrent intent to do violence if confronted");
Beall v. State, 101 A.2d 233, 236 (Md. 1973) (finding assault with intent to commit
murder when the defendant, armed with a loaded revolver, threatened to kill the
victims unless they did what the defendant instructed); People v. Vandelinder, 481
N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (endorsing the holding of the Connors court
that "[g]enerally, a qualified threat or conditional intent is sufficient to establish
assault with intent to kill"); LAFAVE & ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note
3, § 3.5(d), at 312; PERKINS & BOYCE, supranote 14, at 646-47, 835.
'2 See Holloway, 119 S. CL at 971-72. The Court reiterated that "'[a]n intent to
kill, in the alternative, is nevertheless an intent to kill.'" Id. (quoting PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 14, at 647).
'v See id. at 972. The' Court addressed the petitioner's concern by stating that
"[w]hile an empty threat, or intimidating bluff, would be sufficient to satisfy the
latter element, such conduct, standing on its own, is not enough to satisfy § 2119's
specific intent element." Id.; see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding of Hairston v. State, 54 Miss. 689 (1877)).
'28 See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 972.
12 See id.

"o See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
,3, See id. Justice Scalia disagreed with the central passage of the majority's
opinion. See id. The Justice identified the specific passage as: "A carjacker's intent
to harm his victim may be either 'conditional' or 'unconditional.' The statutory
phrase at issue theoretically might describe (1) the former, (2) the latter, or (3) both
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Justice asserted that the customary usage of the word "intent" does
not connote a purpose that is conditional upon the occurrence of
some event so remote that it is effectively nonexistent."2 The Justice
further declared that the concept of "intent" has never embodied
purposes subject to conditions that the speaker wishes will not
happen.'" In other words, the Justice opined "[o]ne can hardly 'seek
to accomplish' a result he hopes will not ensue."' 3' Because Justice
Scalia found the majority's conceptualization of "conditional intent"
obscure and illogical, the Justice argued that the modifying term
"conditional" does nothing to enhance the unmodified word
"intent"."' The Justice then asserted that, because of the normal
English usage of the word intent,1 no method of rationalization

species of intent." Id. (quoting Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 970); see also supra notes 102-04
and accompanying text (discussing this particular passage of the majority opinion).
See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 972 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"
See id. at 972-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice explained that he was
referencing "conditional intent," and, in addition, recognized it as the primary issue
in the case. See id. at 973 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Scalia stated that
the definition of "intent" is"' [a] state of mind in which a person seeks to accomplish
a given result through a course of action.'" Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
Id. (emphasis added).
"
See id. The Justice noted the majority's characterization of intent as being
either conditional or unconditional and remarked that such a characterization is
"mak[ing] the unreasonable seem logical."
Id. In suggesting the possible
idiosyncrasies of devising two distinct categories, Justice Scalia hypothesized adding
the third category of "feigned intent." See id. The Justice, however, explained that
the words "condition" and "feigned" are simply not "conveyed by the word 'intent.'"
Id. The Justice reasoned that "[t]here is intent, conditional intent, and feigned
intent, just as there is agreement, conditional agreement, and feigned agreement but to say that in either case the noun alone, without qualification, 'theoretically
might describe' all three phenomena is simply false." Id. In colorfully supporting
this line of reasoning, Justice Scalia remarked that "[c]onditional intent is no more
embraced by the unmodified word 'intent' than a sea lion is embraced by the
unmodified word 'lion.'" Id.
"5
See id. The Justice illustrated the "normal" usage of intent by explaining:
If I have made a categorical determination to go to Louisiana for the
Christmas holidays, it is accurate for me to say that I "intend" to go to
Louisiana. And that is so even though I realize that there are some
remote and unlikely contingencies - "acts of God," for example that might prevent me. (The fact that these remote contingencies are
always implicit in the expression of intent accounts for the
humorousness of spelling them out in such expressions as "if I should
live so long," or "the Good Lord willing and the creek don't rise.") It is
less precise, though tolerable usage, to say that I "intend" to go if my
purpose is conditional upon an event which, though not virtually
certain to happen (such as my continuing to live), is reasonably likely
to happen, and which I hope will happen.
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could change its plain meaning to accommodate the majority's final
interpretation. 7
Next, Justice Scalia discredited the majority's reliance on legal
authorities that endorse the acceptance of conditional intent as
fundamental to criminal law."" On the contrary, the Justice, relying
on jurisprudence that has rejected the conditional intent rule, 9
argued the absurdity of allowing "intent" to indulge different
meanings depending on the particular criminal statute at issue.'4
Noting the wide spectrum of federal criminal statutes featuring an
intent requirement,141 Justice Scalia underscored the impracticality of
conditional intent's broad "across-the-board" application to the
criminal code.'2 The Justice forewarned that if intent, as the majority
137

See id. Justice Scalia recounted that a carjacker's intent generally is based on

the level of resistance. See id. Emphasizing that the intent is to kill only if resisted,
the Justice posited that the carjacker, therefore, does not have the mislabeled "intent
to kill." See id.
'" See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 973-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted the
majority's reference to five state cases in which courts held that conditional intent
was sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement. See id.; see also supra note 125
(discussing several of these state cases).
159 See id. at 974 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also McArdle v. State, 372 So. 2d 897,
901 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (reversing an assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction,
noting that "[a] conditional offer of violence does not constitute an assault in
Alabama, the criminal intent of the assailant being the essence of the crime and not
the mere fact of unlawfully putting one in fear, creating alarm in the mind or
causing apprehension of immediate battery"); Craddock v. State, 37 So. 2d 778, 778
(Miss. 1948) (remanding an assault-with-intent-to-kill conviction upon the reasoning
that when the defendant's intent to kill is conditioned upon the occurrence of
another event - which may never occur - the real intent never comes into
existence); State v. Irwin, 285 S.E.2d 345, 349 (N.C. CL App. 1982) (rejecting the
concept of conditional intent and finding that, in order to prove assault with intent
to murder, there must be an "actual, existing, and present intent to kill"); State v.
Kinnemore, 295 N.E.2d 680, 683 (Ohio CL App. 1972) (reducing an assault-withintent-to-murder conviction, stating that "It]he threat was conditional, where as an
assault coupled with a present intent to kill necessarily involves continuous,
sequential, and uninterrupted conduct").
'4
See Holloway, 119 S. CL at 974 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia interpreted
the majority's opinion to embrace a form of "intent," which, depending on the
criminal statute in question, may include conditional intent. See id.
...See id. In particular,Justice Scalia identified 18 U.S.C. § 2113's intent to steal, §
152(5)'s intent to defeat the Bankruptcy Code's provisions, § 962's intent to use a
vessel in hostilities levied against a friendly nation, and finally, § 1204's intent to
obstruct a parent from lawfully exercising his or her rights. See id.
2 See id. The Justice provided two examples illustrating the
shortcomings of
conditional intent's incorporation into the criminal code. See id. First, Justice Scalia
focused on 21 U.S.C. § 841, which criminalizes the possession of certain narcotics
with an intent to distribute them. See id. Justice Scalia then hypothesized a situation
in which a person buys a small amount of cocaine solely for his personal use. See id.
Justice Scalia assumed further that, when the person purchased the drug, he
expressed to his wife that if they needed the money, he could simply resell it. See id.
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asserts, varies from being sometimes conditional to other times not,
the Court would ultimately have to "sift through ... many statutes
one-by-one[,] making [its] decision on the basis of such ephemeral
indications of 'congressional purpose' as... used in this case."'
Justice Scalia also commented on the majority's overriding
justification that the Act's cardinal purpose - carjacking deterrence
dictates a blanket interpretation of criminal intent." The justice
argued that, rather than relying on vague and uninformative
legislative history to uncover the legislature's purpose, the Court
should focus on the Act's actual words." With this in mind, Justice
Scalia chastised the majority's incorporation of "conditional intent"
when Congress neither used nor mentioned such phraseology within
the Act.'" Absent the inclusion of more encompassing language
In demonstrating the fallacy of conditional intent, the Justice concluded that, if
conditional intent were sufficient, then this person, who never sold or ever
"intended" to sell drugs in the normal sense, would, nevertheless, be "guilty of
possession with intent to distribute." Id. In his second example, Justice Scalia
focused upon 18 U.S.C. § 2390, which criminalizes enlisting within the United States
"'with intent to serve in armed hostility against the United States.'" Id. (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2390 (1992)). Here, the Justice imagined a Canadian citizen enlisted in the
Canadian armed forces while in the United States, intending to fight in each of
Canada's wars, including, if need be, against the United States. See id. Justice Scalia
declared that, under the auspices of the majority's concept of conditional intent, the
enlistee would be guilty. See id. Moreover, Justice Scalia scoffed at the single case,
after nearly two hundred years of federal criminal litigation, involving the
interpretation of a federal statute that applied the conditional intent rule. See id.
(citing Shaffer v. United States, 308 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir. 1962)). Indeed, the
Justice remarked that the application of real intent would have sufficed in that case.
See id.
'
Id. at 974-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 975 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In describing the
majority's reliance on the congressional purpose to deter carjacking, the Justice
referred to the majority's assertion that it "'is better served by construing the statute
to cover both the conditional and the unconditional species of wrongful intent."' Id.
(quoting Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 971).
1 See id. Justice Scalia obliquely referred to the two legislators' statements, which
spoke generally about broadening and strengthening the carjacking statute as well as
severely punishing carjackers. See id.; see also supra note 24 (providing the statements
of Representative Franks and Senator Lieberman). The Justice warned that every act
hopes to achieve the enunciated policy objectives, but only by the means specified.
See id. TheJustice found that "[I]
imitations upon the means employed to achieve the
policy goal are no less a 'purpose' of the statute than the policy goal itself." Id. In
supporting this argument, the Justice reasoned that the obvious way to determine
Congress's true meaning is not by intuition, but rather by looking at the words
enacted, which here specifically required an intent to kill. See id.
'46
See id. at 976 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice warned that the majority's
creation of words sends a confusing signal to juries and courts. See id. Consequently,
the Justice observed that "[i]t is difficult enough to determine a defendant's actual
intent; it is infinitely more difficult to determine what the defendant planned to do
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characterizing a broader scope of carjacking coverage, the Justice
concluded that the only plausible interpretation is that Congress
solely focused on the carjacker's intent to kill. 7 Finally, Justice Scalia
argued that, although the Act is entirely unambiguous, even if it were
the rule of lenity would compel a finding on Ali's
ambiguous,
141
behalf.
Justice Thomas, dissenting, refuted the majority's interpretation
of the term "intent" in that it included the notion of "conditional"
intent.'49 Significantly, the Justice noted the omission of a definition
that expressly enunciates the meaning of "intent."'50 Furthermore,
Justice Thomas remarked that, although the majority cited some
authority accepting the conditional intent doctrine, this authority
clearly did not establish that the acceptance of conditional intent was
well-settled.' 5' Accordingly, the Justice concluded that the Court
could not presume congressional awareness of the conditional intent
the Court could not read the Act to incorporate
rule, and, as a result,
52
conditional intent.

With Holloway, the Supreme Court formally validated the
concept of conditional intent, which had lacked the ceremonious
endorsement that has been provided to a host of other American
legal doctrines.'" Notwithstanding the comprehensive legal support
that marked the conditional intent doctrine as an entrenched aspect
upon the happening of an event that the defendant hoped would not happen, and
that he himself may not have come to focus upon." Id.
17 See id. The Justice explained:
Had Congress meant to cast its carjacking act so broadly, it could have
achieved that result.., by defining the crime as "carjacking under the
threat of death or serious bodily injury." Given the language here, I
find it much more plausible that Congress meant to reach - as it said
- the carjacker who intended to kill.
Id.
'48 See id.; see also supra notes 47 (defining the rule of lenity) and 48 and
accompanying text.
"
See Holloway, 119 S. Ct. at 977 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
"0 See id. Justice Thomas asserted that "[t] he central difficulty in this case is that
the text is silent as to the meaning of 'intent' - the carjacking statute does not
define that word, and Title 18 of the United States Code, unlike some state codes,
lacks a general section defining intent to include conditional intent." Id.
"' See id. (" [T] hat authority does not demonstrate that such a usage was part of a
well-established historical tradition.").
152 See id.
'" See, e.g., In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (providing constitutional status
to the reasonable doubt rule under the auspices of due process); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (concluding that a "trial by jury in criminal cases
is fundamental to the American scheme of justice"); see also supra note 2 (discussing
the reasonable doubt standard and the Winship decision).
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of American criminal law, the Court was compelled to substantiate its
ultimate conclusion with weaker supporting rationales. Indeed, the
Court's legitimation of conditional intent demanded a thorough
discussion to bolster its validity and to systematically defuse potential
objections. Conversely, the dissents' capitalization on the perceived
shortcomings of the majority's opinion reflects an indifference to the
widespread acceptance of an entrenched legal theory. Driving the
dissenting justices is their strict adherence to "textualism," a muchmaligned interpretive method.""
The pure textualist approach to statutory interpretation
embraces a refusal to consider anything beyond the "plain meaning"
of a statute as derived solely from the ordinary understanding or
comprehension of its explicit words and overall structure.
Noticeably absent from this interpretive approach is the examination
of the legislative process and history underlying the statute's
inception.' Pure textualists argue that all external statutory factors
are irrelevant and that the text of the statute, standing alone, is
sufficient to provide a reasonable interpretation.
Textualism has been denounced on numerous grounds. The
primary shortcoming of this methodology is its failure to consider
context-dependent factors that play an indelible part in a statute's
evolution.157
Indeed, Justice Souter has responded that, when
deciphering a statute's meaning and intended purpose, any resulting
inquiry must factor in the process that gave rise to the statute's
creation and, therefore, extend beyond the four corners of the text.'Additionally, textualism suffers from a presumption that a statute complex in nature and facially ambiguous - is capable of being

...See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion
of"textualism" and its approach to statutory interpretation).
...See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 277, 285 (1990) ("[T]he textualist view logically points to a full-scale attack on

the use of any and all extra-statutory materials under any and all circumstances.").
16 See Wald, supra note 155, at 285. Textualists do not believe that legislative
history is less authoritative compared to explicit statutory language. See id. "Rather,
much of the textualists' critique attacks reliance on materials other than statutory
text because Congress has a voice as a constitutional player only through its finally
enacted statutes, not through any supplementary explanation thereof." Id.
"' See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "PlainMeaning": Justice Scalia'sJurisprudenceof Strict

Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 401, 405-06 (1994). Judge Richard
Posner argues that the textualist, or plain meaning view, neglects to consider the
"external ambiguities" that are intended to be a part of the meaning of the text. See
id.
158 See Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 406.
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construed in a single plausible interpretation.'5 9 Notwithstanding the
reasonable misgivings overshadowing the textualist ideal, Justice
Scalia has vigorously spearheaded a revival of this once seemingly
dormant approach.' 6°
Although Justice Scalia has not espoused pure textualism, his
version 6 ' nevertheless seeks the bright-line exclusion of legislative
history as a primary means for interpreting a statute. 62 justice Scalia's
departure from true textualism lies in his willingness to consider
some external factors, which essentially acknowledges that a statute
must be read in context.'1
Despite Justice Scalia's mitigated
application of textualism,
the majority has continuously
demonstrated its general rejection of the textualist doctrine by
159 See

Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 475 (identifying as one of textualism's
vulnerabilities "that a complex, apparently ambiguous, and possibly inartfully drafted
statutory text is capable of only a single plausible construction").
'60 Many observers believed that the plain meaning standard was effectively
rendered void in 1940 when Justice Reed stated, in United States v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, that "[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use,
however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'" Karkkainen, supra
note 157, at 436 (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 54344 (1940)). The Court, however, has never strictly relied on this holding. See id.
161 Justice Scalia's version of textualism has been labeled
"new textualism." See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623 (1990). This
interpretive theory proffers that once the plain meaning of a statute has been
determined, then its legislative history is rendered irrelevant. See id. In fact,
irrespective of the situation, legislative history is deemed useless in the process of
ascertaining the statute's meaning. See id. Rather, the statutory text and structure,
along with the assistance of the canons of statutory construction, are to act as the
guideposts for the statute's interpretation. See id. at 623-24.
162 See Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 433. Justice Scalia continually opposes the
use of legislative history as evidence of congressional intent; instead, the Justice
promotes the literal construction of statutes governed by unambiguous interpretative
rules legislated by Congress. See id. The cardinal rule, forJustice Scalia, is the "Plain
Meaning Rule," which allows courts to abstain from recognizing legislative history if
the import of the statute is clear or plain on its face. See id.
At least one author has criticized Justice Scalia's erroneous use of the "Plain
Meaning Rule," stating that this standard does not act as a blanket prohibition to the
utilization of legislative history regardless of the circumstances. See id. at 436-37. On
the contrary, the plain meaning standard "explicitly endorses the use of legislative
history to resolve ambiguities and interpretive doubts in a statutory text." Id. The
rule was created to prohibit the consideration of legislative history only when the
statute was so plain and clear on its face that a search of its subsequent history was
unnecessary. See id. at 435.
'63
See Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 408. Although Justice Scalia forswears
reliance on legislative history, "other kinds of extratextual historical and factual
evidence are within the bounds of interpretation. Use of this kind of external
contextual evidence is inconsistent with a purely textualist approach to statutory
interpretation." Id. Additionally, the surrounding body of law and legal context, in
Justice Scalia's view, are also pertinent to the understanding of a statute. See id.
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placing legislative
history at the forefront of statutory
1
interpretation. 4 This is not to say, however, that Justice Scalia's
textualist approach has not made an impact. To be sure, since Justice
Scalia's appointment in 1986, the Court has, to some degree,
minimized its overall reliance on legislative history as a tool for
ascertaining a statute's meaning. 6' It is also not surprising that
Justice Scalia is able to depend on the support of Justice Thomas,
who similarly has echoed the textualist approach."6 True to form,
both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have continued to advance the
textualist 167argument, as evidenced by their dissenting opinions in
Holloway.
The glaring criticisms of the textualist methodology clearly
surface upon analysis of the dissenters' opinions in Holloway. To
illustrate, Justice Scalia implemented a perceived common
understanding of the word "intent" to refute the possibility that it
may encompass differing meanings. 6
Because adherents of
textualism often employ a narrow and arbitrarily chosen dictionary
definition to foreclose varying interpretations,'9 critics properly
advise that such an approach ignores the reality that crucial terms, in
some statutory instances, are meant to embrace broad, multidimensional meanings.' 70 That being said, the concept of conditional
'64 See Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 401.
Justice Scalia's approach has not
received the general support of the Court. See id. As evidence, the Court has never
openly endorsed Justice Scalia's interpretive approach in a majority opinion. See id.
'6 See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History:
The Impact ofJustice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 369 (1999) (explaining
that "there has been a significant decrease in the Supreme Court's reliance on
legislative history documents, attributable at least in part to Justice Scalia's criticism
of its use").
'6
See Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 401. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy has also
subscribed to justice Scalia's textualist approach. See id.
.67See Holloway v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 966, 972-77 (1999); see also supra notes
130-52 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinions of Justices Scalia
and Thomas).
See id. at 972-73. Justice Scalia invoked the "customary English usage" of
"intent" to rule out the possibility that it may be construed as conditional. See id.
Additionally, the Justice provided the dictionary definition of "intent" to support the
contention that the term "conditional" never appears. See id. at 973; see also note 133
(reproducingJustice Scalia's dictionary definition of "intent").
'6 See Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 439-40.
While adhering to the precise
statutory text is crucial, Justice Scalia, when given a choice, typically chooses to
interpret the statute narrowly, instead of liberally. See id. To accomplish this, the
Justice "appeals to a narrow dictionary definition of a crucial word or phrase to reach
what he claims is the definitive plain meaning of the larger text." Id. at 440.
170 See Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 440. The plain meaning standard does not
compel, asJustice Scalia would otherwise argue, the implementation of the narrowest
possible definition of a crucial statutory term. See id. On the contrary, judges could
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intent historically has arisen to satisfy the mens rea element of
assault.'
Although criminal statutes rarely explained or defined
intent as being purposeful as well as conditional, the legal system
recognized the two versions as inextricably linked, and, therefore, the
term "intent" included both possibilities.'7 Not unlike other assaultoriented statutes, the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 undoubtedly
contemplated an expansive interpretation of "intent." The majority,
guided by legislative history and a recognition of the validity of
conditional intent, and unfettered by constraints of textualism that
would shackle Justices Scalia and Thomas, rightly gave judicial
credence to the Act, and more significantly, to the concept of
conditional intent.'"
Samuel E. Peckham

insist on expansive readings of the "statutory text" to determine its "plain meaning."
See id.
" See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
conditional intent and its evolution).
7 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
conditional intent and its evolution).
" Ironically, Justice Scalia's
textualist approach appears to inadvertently
countermand the conservative dogma his opinions historically champion. See
generally Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism of Antonin Scalia, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 1
(1990) (detailing Justice Scalia's conservative policy stance). Indeed, the Justice's
position on the Act's interpretation errs on the side of individual liberties, while
notably attempting to deprive or lessen the effectiveness of a much-needed statutory
tool to law enforcement. Temporarily abandoning their traditionally conservative
roles on the Court, Justice Scalia's and Thomas's insistence that textualism is the
proper interpretative methodology, regardless of the practical effect, ostensibly
undermines their own stated doctrinal teachings. While the term "liberal" has never
been freely associated with either of the Justices, that is precisely the word which
describes the product of their unabashed support for textualism. See Emery G. Lee
III et al., Context and the Court: Sources of Support for Civil Liberties on the Rehnquist Court,
24 AM. POL Q. 377, 393 n.1 (1996) ("Cases in which the Court finds for the
individual (prodefendant, prominority, pro-under dog," etc.) and/or against the
state are coded as "liberal" in direction. ....
).

